Political Liberalism and Property-Owning Democracy in Contemporary Capitalism by Martins, Nuno Ornelas
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL VALUES | VOLUME I | NÚMERO 1 | JUN. 2018
 POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND PROPERTY-




(ucp – católica porto business school | cege)
Introduction
In the political conception of justice developed by John Rawls, the 
emphasis is on reaching a political consensus amongst heterogeneous 
moral views, a consensus where the more basic elements of a social 
contract are respected, within a liberal framework (Rawls, 1993). This 
political consensus cannot be a comprehensive view, as in a moral (as 
opposed to political) conception of justice. Quite the contrary, it must 
be sufficiently broad in order to accommodate different comprehensive 
moral views within a political consensus.
The political conception of justice has an attractive feature, namely 
the fact that it seems to point toward the possibility of a tolerant society, 
in which different comprehensive moral views are accepted. In order 
to achieve a political consensus amongst heterogeneous moral views, 
political liberalism presupposes a separation between a public sphere, 
where a consensus must exist concerning laws that must be applicable 
to everyone, and a private sphere where each one has discretion for 
adopting heterogeneous views. In the political conception of justice, 
justice addresses the public sphere, and its subject is the basic structure 
of society, constituted by the major social institutions that distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of the advan-
tages of social cooperation (Rawls, 1971, 6 -7).
There are, however, great difficulties in accommodating the modern 
corporation of contemporary capitalism within the Rawlsian concep-
tion of justice. It is clear that corporations influence greatly the division 
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of the advantages of social cooperation, and hence meet the criterion 
for being a part of the basic structure of society (Martins, 2017). But it 
is not clear how modern corporations fit into the liberal distinction 
between public and private, presupposed in Rawls’s idea of a political 
consensus (Singer, 2015). If the corporation is seen as a private associ-
ation, rather than a public institution, it would not fit into the basic 
structure of society after all, despite its great influence on the division 
of the advantages of social cooperation.
This problem is greatly amplified by Rawls’s emphasis on charac-
terizing just institutions in a well -ordered society, understood as a soci-
ety where a shared sense of justice exists, thus enabling the existence 
of a system of law that respects human rights and moral obligations 
connected to such a shared sense of justice. Such an emphasis leads to 
the neglect of what Rawls (1999) calls burdened societies, which are 
prevented from achieving a well -ordered regime due to historical, 
social and economic conditions. But since the same corporation can 
operate simultaneously on well -ordered societies and on burdened 
societies, it becomes difficult to maintain a focus on ideal conditions 
only. This is connected to what Amartya Sen (2009) sees as Rawls’s 
transcendental institutionalism, that is, a focus on ideal institutions, 
rather than actually existing institutions.
Thus, the attractive features of a political conception of justice seem 
to vanish once the modern corporation is brought into the picture. The 
political conception of justice is attractive because it seems to provide 
a promising route for accommodating heterogeneous views, which 
would make it particularly suitable for addressing justice in a global 
world where many different comprehensive views exist. But the way 
in which those heterogeneous views are accommodated leads to the 
neglect of the specific problems raised by the modern corporation, 
including the fact that it does not fit well into the liberal distinction 
between public and private (Singer, 2015).
Furthermore, a purely political conception ultimately presupposes 
a contractarian approach, one in which power is widely distributed, 
within what Rawls calls a property -owning democracy. Such an 
approach leads to a view of the corporation in which the corporation 
is a nexus of contracts between property -owners. But as I shall argue, 
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modern corporations pose important problems to such a contractarian 
framework, due to the complex specification of rights and duties within 
the corporate world. I shall argue that such a complex configuration of 
rights and duties leads to the need of a moral conception that takes into 
account the social ontology of the corporation.
Justice and property -owning democracy
When formulating his theory of justice, Rawls emphasizes that the 
main subject he is addressing is what he calls the basic structure of 
society. As Rawls writes:
“For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or 
more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fun-
damental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from 
social cooperation. By major institutions I understand the political consti-
tution and the principal economic and social arrangements. Thus the legal 
protection of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience, competitive 
markets, private property in the means of production, and the monoga-
mous family are examples of major social institutions. Taken together as 
one scheme, the major institutions define men’s rights and duties and influ-
ence their life prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can 
hope to do.” (Rawls, 1971, 6 -7)
Since the basic structure of society is the primary subject of Rawls’s 
theory of justice, discussions on how Rawls’s approach can be applied 
to business ethics have focused on whether the corporation can be seen 
as part of the basic structure of society (Norman, 2015; Singer, 2015; 
Martins, 2017). But the inclusion of corporations in the basic structure 
of society is not straightforward for various reasons, which ultimately 
spring from the contractarian nature of Rawls’s political liberalism.
Rawls’s political liberalism advocates the emergence of an overlap-
ping consensus which can accommodate various comprehensive views. 
To do so, such an overlapping consensus cannot be a comprehensive 
view in itself. Rather, it must focus on some key principles, while leav-
ing many issues unaddressed, so as to allow for heterogeneous views 
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within an overlapping consensus around those key principles. Those 
key principles are specified in Rawls’s two principles of justice. Rawls’s 
first principle of justice states that each person should have the most 
extensive liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others. Rawls’s 
second principle states that social and economic inequalities are justi-
fied only when they are to the greatest benefit to the least -advantaged 
members of society, under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
The basic structure of society must include a set of major social insti-
tutions that allow for the fulfillment of those principles.
The concrete regime through which Rawls seems to believe that his 
principles of justice can be best realized is that of a property -owning 
democracy, a term he takes from James Meade (1964), while using it 
within a liberal framework (O’Neill, 2009; O’Neill and Williamson, 
2009). In a property -owning democracy, capital would be dispersed 
amongst all individuals, and the intergenerational transmission of 
advantage would be blocked (O’Neill, 2009, 382), thus attenuating the 
problem of inequality. In fact, a property -owning democracy could deal 
more effectively with the problem of inequality than welfare -state cap-
italism. In welfare -state capitalism, redistribution is made ex -post, with-
out changing the underlying social relations of power and status 
connected to the mode of production (O’Neill, 2009, 383). In a property-
-owning democracy, in contrast, it is not only income inequality, but all 
the dimensions of inequality connected to power and status that would 
be addressed through wide dispersal of capital and by blocking the 
intergenerational transmission of advantage (O’Neill, 2009, 382), thus 
providing a more complete realization of Rawls’s idea of fair equality 
of opportunity.
While Rawls refers to the idea of a property -owning democracy as 
originating from Meade (1964), Meade seems to have appropriated the 
term from political opponents, namely British Conservatives who used 
it after its first usage by the British Conservative politician Noel Skelton 
(O’Neill, 2009, 393). In fact, the idea of a wide dispersal of capital can 
be found as far back as Hilaire Belloc’s The Servile State (Belloc, 1912), 
who advocated what he called the system of “property”, also termed 
“distributism”, while defining “Conservatives or Traditionalists” (Bel-
loc, 1912, 105 -106) as those who advocate a wide distribution of 
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property that, according to Belloc, characterized the pre -Reformation 
Christian European life, and Britain in particular before the expropri-
ation of land that followed the Reformation.
Regardless of whether a property -owning democracy is ultimately 
a conservative or liberal goal, going from contemporary capitalism 
towards a property -owning democracy is not straightforward. As Bel-
loc (1912, 109 -110) notes, it is much easier to say that no one shall own 
private property, as in collectivist socialism, than to say that all shall 
own private property. In the case of collectivism, there is no need of 
finding a criterion for the distribution of property. In the case of a 
property -owning democracy, the question of how to distribute prop-
erty is raised immediately. Furthermore, in a world where property is 
already very concentrated and social relationships of power and status 
prevail it is not easy to establish a system where those social relations 
suddenly disappear.
Rawls’s ideal theory, however, is concerned first with defining an 
already just society, rather than with how to achieve it. So we can start 
by looking at how it can function before addressing the problem of 
reaching it. In particular, it is important to assess whether a property-
-owning democracy can help addressing the problem of how corpora-
tions fit within Rawls’s political liberalism.
Under a property -owning democracy, corporations could be assim-
ilated into a liberal framework in which the shares of the corporation 
are widely distributed. This ties in well with the contractual view of 
the corporation, according to which the corporation, like any firm, is a 
nexus of contracts amongst individuals. Rawls mentions competitive 
markets and private property in the means of production as part of the 
basic structure of society. Corporations could be subsumed under these 
two major institutions within a contractual view in which the corpora-
tion is the result of contracts within a competitive market between 
property -owners.
The contractual view of the corporation, in turn, is certainly in line 
with the liberal dichotomy between public and private, while placing 
the corporation in the private sphere. This could ultimately mean that 
corporations are not part of the basic structure of society, as advocated 
by Abraham Singer (2015), as they are really private associations that 
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individuals can exit by simply taking a share of capital with them. Since 
in a property -owning democracy capital is widely shared, the share the 
individual takes would be rather small, so no great disturbance would 
follow for the life of the corporation.
A problem with this view, however, is that the liberal notion of prop-
erty can hardly be applied to contemporary corporations, because it is 
not possible to specify absolute rights of use, fruition and disposal of 
the corporation in a liberal framework, as I shall now argue. This is 
indeed acknowledged by Ciepley (2013) and Singer (2015), who cor-
rectly conclude that the corporation does not fit easily into a liberal 
framework. I shall now address this problem, starting by explaining 
the meaning of property and freedom in liberalism, before showing 
why corporations cannot be properly understood within a purely lib-
eral framework such as the one presupposed by the contractual view 
of the corporation.
Property -owning democracy and the liberal view
A property -owning democracy is an ideal system, considered by Rawls 
at the level of ideal theory, but does not correspond to anything 
observed in reality. Belloc (1912) argues that a system of distributed 
property, or an approximation to it at least, existed in Christian Europe 
before the Reformation. But Belloc (1912, 48) is using the term “prop-
erty” in a different way than it is used today, for the notion of property 
that prevailed in medieval Christianity is very different from the con-
temporary notion. In the classical Roman period, there was an absolute 
right over property (plena in re potestas), expressed in the right of use, 
fruition and disposal (ius utendi, ius fruendi, ius abutendi). In medieval 
feudalism, in contrast, this absolute right is divided into the lord’s 
dominium directum and the serf’s dominium utile. The power of the lord 
is no longer an absolute power over the land, but only the power to 
demand various forms of rent and services from the serf, who has the 
right to cultivate the land, and cannot be evicted from it.
The 1789 French Revolution leads again to the institution of absolute 
property rights. The idea driving the French revolutionaries is, of 
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course, to provide a system of distributed property where those who 
work the land are no longer subject to various obligations toward the 
feudal lord. For this to be so, those who work the land must have abso-
lute property rights, rather than being subject to various obligations to 
feudal lords. In this sense, the French revolution, and the liberal revo-
lutions that followed it, are attempts to institute a property -owning 
democracy of sorts. But periods where an absolute right over property 
prevail, such as the Roman period, or the modern period following the 
French Revolution, seem to be periods where we find a tendency for a 
concentration of property and capital, thus preventing the implemen-
tation of a property -owning democracy where capital is widely dis-
persed.
The Roman and the modern periods stand in contrast to the medi-
eval institutional framework, where the lord cannot demand more than 
a fixed amount of various rents and services, cannot evict the serf from 
the land, and cannot prevent the serf from working on common land 
and receive fully the fruits of this labor on common lands. Those restric-
tions seem to have been effective in preventing concentration of land, 
since land could not be freely exchanged and disposed of as absolute 
property. The medieval guilds were also examples of associations that 
prevented the concentration and centralization of capital in some indi-
viduals. Adam Smith’s (1776) critique of guilds and corporations was 
aimed at the removal of the relations of status and power that charac-
terized those associations, so as to lead to an absolute right of the 
worker to the produce of labor within a liberal framework (Martins, 
2013, 424 -426). But an absolute right not only of use and fruition, but 
also of arbitrary disposal over property, leads to the removal of the 
obstacles to the accumulation, concentration and centralization of cap-
ital by some individuals (Marx, 1867).
This raises some problems regarding the possibility of a sustainable 
property -owning democracy, that is, a system with a wide distribution 
of capital with absolute property rights, as property rights should pre-
sumably be in a liberal framework, while avoiding the tendency 
towards capitalism, understood as a system where some individuals 
accumulate capital while others remain dispossessed. Capitalist accu-
mulation, in turn, poses structural problems that, according to Rawls, 
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cannot be overcome by supplementing capitalism with a welfare state. 
As O’Neill (2009, 379) explains, Rawls’s (2001) later works show a 
greater hostility towards welfare -state capitalism. This is so because 
albeit welfare -state capitalism can rectify the inequalities of income and 
wealth through ex post transfer payments, it cannot rectify the inequal-
ities of power and status that spring from the very productive structure 
under capitalism (O’Neill 2009, 383). So welfare -state capitalism ulti-
mately allows for unequal social relations of power and status, which 
Rawls’s seeks to overcome through a liberal framework of distributed 
property and contractual relations that would hopefully be less subject 
to power and status. In fact, this is the goal of liberal authors since 
Adam Smith (1776) at least, who believed that the best remedy against 
status and power in social relations is through a decentralized system 
where individuals engage freely in contracts.
There is, however, a fundamental problem with the contractarian 
approach presupposed in the various forms of political liberalism. The 
problem is that it is difficult to specify contractual relations where sta-
tus and power play no role. As John Searle (2010) and Tony Lawson 
(2012, 2015) note, when explaining corporations from a social ontology 
perspective, human activity in general presupposes the existence of 
status, through which power relationships are established. This is 
because human activity presupposes the stability and persistence of 
collective practices so that social coordination arises. But the persistence 
of collective practices leads to the expectation that they be continued, 
and they start to be regarded as an obligation which others have the right 
to expect (Lawson, 2012, 362). This means that human activity is inher-
ently normative, that is, it presupposes rights and obligations, not least 
in the very use of language, which only makes sense if we assume that 
the speaker has the obligation to tell the truth (Searle, 2010, 80).
This means that it is not possible to adopt a purely political concep-
tion of justice, which somehow eschews the necessity of a shared moral 
conception at some level. The more fruitful route is then to look at a 
social ontology that helps identifying shared notions of rights and 
duties at some level (Lawson, 2003; Martins, 2007), rather than trying 
to identify a purely contractual framework that minimizes moral com-
mitments in the hope of accommodating as many comprehensive views 
POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND PROPERTY -OWNING DEMOCRACY | 61
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL VALUES | VOLUME I | NÚMERO 1 | JUN. 2018
as possible. At best, one may try to achieve a fairer distribution of 
power and status, rather than abolishing power and status altogether. 
For even market relations presuppose trust in those who have a certain 
status as to trustworthiness, power for implementing laws, and so on, 
as Adam Smith saw clearly.
As Searle (2010, 134) notes, Rawls’s theory is an update of social 
contract theory that takes institutions for granted in order to distin-
guish just institutions from unjust institutions, but without questioning 
the nature of the institutions being discussed. A central institution that 
must be further scrutinized is the modern corporation, which seems to 
transgress the liberal divide between public and private. Even if we 
follow the Rawlsian method of focusing on a basic structure of society 
while leaving aside private associations, an analysis of the social ontol-
ogy underlying the modern corporation shows that the latter cannot 
simply be left out of the basic structure of society, due to its influence 
on the division of the advantages of social cooperation, which is a cen-
tral concern for Rawls’s conception of justice (Martins, 2017). I shall 
now address the case of corporations in more detail.
Corporations and political liberalism
Legal personality is a legal mechanism that can be given to natural 
persons or to organizational structures such as the corporation (Deakin, 
2012, 354). Since the corporation has a separate legal personality, the 
shareholders are not the owners of the corporation. One could tend to 
think that by owning shares of the corporation, the shareholders own 
part of its assets. But since the corporation is a legal person, the corpo-
ration is allowed to own its assets, and so the assets belong to the 
corporation, rather than to the shareholders (Deakin, 2012, 355). And 
according to company law, even the directors of the corporation are the 
agents of the corporation itself, rather than of the shareholders, contra-
rily to what is presupposed in contractual principal -agent theory 
(Deakin, 2012, 360). For this reason, it becomes very difficult to specify 
property rights in a contractual view of the corporation (Deakin, 2012, 
367), as it would be the case in a property -owning democracy.
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It is for this reason that Singer (2015) argues that there is no Rawlsian 
theory of corporate governance. Singer (2015) argues that the corpora-
tion is an association aimed at particular ends, while the basic structure 
of society defines rules for a social contract under which it is left to each 
individual to find her or his own ends or aims. For Rawls, business firms 
have their own internal life and rules (Rawls, 2001, 164; Singer, 2015, 
78 -79; Blanc, 2016, 411), which are created within the possibilities allowed 
by the basic structure, but are not themselves part of the basic structure. 
Singer’s line of argument then could suggest that albeit corporations 
certainly transgress the liberal divide between public and private, they 
are best seen as part of the private sphere. The public sphere is consti-
tuted by the major institutions that all individuals must accept, and are 
thus legally coercive, in the sense that individuals do not have the choice 
to exit its authority. In the liberal framework presupposed by Rawls, 
individuals are free to choose their particular ends or aims at the private 
level, as long as they remain legally committed to the key principles 
accepted in an overlapping consensus. Corporations, Singer (2015) 
argues, can be exited, and thus are not legally coercive. Thus, they are 
not connected to the basic structure of society, which comprises only the 
binding commitments that all individuals must accept in Rawls’s polit-
ical liberalism, as part of an overlapping consensus.
However, one can certainly question whether individuals can really 
exit a corporation so easily within modern capitalism. Within a liberal 
framework such as that presupposed by Rawls, one would tend to 
think that individuals have the legal option to exit a corporation. The 
legal right to exit the corporation is amongst the basic rules accepted 
by all individuals in an overlapping consensus. It is questionable, how-
ever, whether private contracts are not subject to legal coercion too, as 
Blanc (2016, 416) notes. Blanc (2016, 417) further argues that the activ-
ities of corporations are intrinsically connected to coercion not only 
over employees, but also over citizens in general, who cannot escape 
the various implications of “state -backed corporate governance”.
In fact, another reason why the corporation cannot be seen as a mere 
nexus of contracts is because it is not possible to identify a clear legal 
framework in which several individuals agree to a series of contracts, 
as the contractual view of the corporation presupposes. Deakin (2012, 
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365) notes that the corporation is subject to many different legislations, 
such as the law of the corporation as a legal person, insolvency law, 
employment law, tort law, competition law or tax law, for example. 
There is no single legal vision of the firm and of the rights and duties 
of stakeholders. This is another reason why it becomes difficult to sus-
tain a view where the corporation is merely a series of clear contracts 
between an agent and principal. And it also means that it may be dif-
ficult to define legal coercion in practice, given the multiple legislations 
that are at play in the social relations between the stakeholders.
Moreover, one could also question the very idea of defining an exit 
option only in terms of legal coercion. Doing so certainly ties in well 
with Rawls’s liberal framework, which presupposes a commitment to 
basic principles to be accepted by all reasonable citizens within an over-
lapping consensus. But a definition of an exit option only in terms of 
legal coercion does not take into account that the possibilities offered 
to individuals depend upon the whole structure of society, rather than 
its basic structure only. This is especially so in a world where corpora-
tions and their hierarchies based on status (Lawson, 2015; Martins, 
2017) play a key role.
Singer (2015, 68) draws upon Ciepley (2013), who argues that cor-
porations share a common history with republics (Ciepley, 2013, 141-
-142), and are intrinsically linked to the state and government, through 
which corporations receive their charter or corporate constitution (Cie-
pley, 2013, 143). It is also through government that corporations receive 
their contractual individuality or “personhood”, and thus their right 
to own property, to make contracts and to engage in juridical relations 
in general (Ciepley, 2013, 143). These rights are essential for separating 
the property of the corporation from the right of its individual mem-
bers. This suggests that the corporation is not merely a private associ-
ation of individuals, for it exists as a legal person with rights and 
obligations different from those of individuals (Searle, 2010; Lawson, 
2015; Martins, 2017). But it is also not a public entity, since it is not 
managed by public officials, and the managers of the corporations are 
also not subordinated to public authorities.
The connection between the corporation and government would 
suggest that the corporation is part of the basic structure of society after 
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all. For it is intrinsically connected to a major institution which is cer-
tainly constitutive of the basic structure of society, namely the govern-
ment. In fact, Blanc (2016) argues, when replying to Singer (2015), that 
we must distinguish between the “Corporate” form in general, which 
is granted by the government, from particular corporations, which are 
the object of Singer’s analysis.
Ciepley (2013) concludes that the corporation does not fit totally into 
the public sphere, and does not fit into the private sphere as well, so it 
is best seen as somewhere between public category and private cate-
gory, within a category of its own, the corporate category. This could 
mean, of course, that Rawls’s theory of justice should simply be dis-
carded from business ethics, since corporations do not easily fit into 
the liberal separation between private and public presupposed in the 
liberal framework, as Singer (2015) argues.
The political conception of justice is highlighted by Rawls’s espe-
cially in later writings (Rawls, 1993, 2001). In his earlier formulation of 
a theory of justice, in contrast, Rawls (1971) focused in more detail on 
the major institutions that would comprise the basic structure of soci-
ety. I will now argue that if we focus on Rawls’s institutionalism, under-
stood as an emphasis on the institutional context that structures the 
economy and society, while abstracting from the idea of a political 
conception of justice, we can find useful elements in Rawls’s theory of 
justice for understanding the place of the modern corporation in the 
contemporary world. However, Rawls’s analysis of institutions would 
have to be combined with the need of shared moral values, rather than 
assuming that consensus can emerge at a purely political level.
Furthermore, the analysis of the institutions that constitute the basic 
structure of society will have to focus also on actually existing institu-
tions, rather than on ideal institutions only (Sen, 2009). Once these 
moral and historical elements are brought into the picture, Rawls’s idea 
that all individuals must engage in a public discussion of the overall 
structure of society in which they live, becomes a fruitful one. I shall 
start by considering the specific institutional frameworks envisaged by 
Rawls, in order to develop this aspect of Rawls’s (1971) original formu-
lation of his theory of justice, which has received less attention.
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Corporations and liberal socialism
A central question at this stage is whether the social and economic 
regimes that Rawls sees as consistent with his theory of justice could 
somehow be conceived of in a way that is not inconsistent with the 
modern corporation or, alternatively, whether the modern corporation 
can be transformed into something that is compatible with Rawls’s 
framework, and provides a more just society according to Rawls’s prin-
ciples of justice. The fact that the contractual view of the corporation 
fails as a means of dealing with corporations through a liberal frame-
work (while placing corporations outside of the basic structure of soci-
ety, as mere associations between property owners in a competitive 
market) need not mean that there are no other (less obvious) ways of 
dealing with corporations drawing on Rawlsian insights. Here it is 
important to bear in mind that Rawls refers not only to a property-
-owning democracy, but also to Mill’s socialism, as social and economic 
regimes through which Rawls’s principles of justice can be realized.
An important difference between property -owning democracy and 
liberal socialism is that in a property -owning democracy, at least if 
interpreted in purely contractarian and liberal terms, individuals can 
still work for a firm that belongs to other individuals. A worker will 
own property, but such property need not be the capital of the company 
in which the individual works. And once property rights are absolute, 
there is nothing preventing the concentration, centralization and accu-
mulation of capital, leading to a world where modern corporations 
play a key role in the coordination of economic activity. But as noted 
above, the modern corporation, being subject to multiple legislations 
(Deakin, 2012, 365), leads to a case where we cannot really identify 
absolute rights of use, fruition and disposal which are necessary in a 
liberal framework where the members of the corporation stand in 
merely contractual relations.
The emergence of modern corporations as the most successful insti-
tution in modern capitalism is often associated with their greater effi-
ciency (Chandler, 1977). In fact, Karl Marx (1894) seemed to believe that 
the modern corporation would be the most successful capitalist organ-
ization, especially in his last years when writing volume III of Capital 
66 | NUNO ORNELAS MARTINS
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY & SOCIAL VALUES | VOLUME I | NÚMERO 1 | JUN. 2018
(Martins, 2013, 414 -416). Marx (1894) saw the separation of ownership 
and property as an opportunity to reshape production relations in a 
way through which workers could manage the corporation.
The idea that the corporation contains a complex set of social rela-
tionships that cannot be reduced to private contracts is central to Marx 
(1894) in his more mature writings. Marx argues that corporations pre-
suppose a socialization of production, to the extent that the separation 
between owners and managers leads to a governance structure that 
cannot be fully understood in terms of private contracts. Marx (1894, 
569) saw corporations as “private production unchecked by private 
ownership” (Martins, 2013, 415), since owners no longer play a role in 
production, not even in controlling directors, managers or workers. 
The next step, for Marx, would then be to socialize distribution in a 
capitalist world where production was already socialized.
The distinction between production and distribution is stressed 
even more strongly by Mill (1848), who argues that the key problem to 
address is distribution, rather than production. While Marx thought 
that worker management had to be achieved at the end of a process of 
capitalist concentration and centralization, and in different ways 
depending on whether political institutions in various countries would 
require revolutionary action or not, Mill thought that worker manage-
ment could be readily initiated in cooperatives, which would have to 
be more competitive than capitalist firms.
Mill’s approach is a form of socialism because the members of an 
association own collectively the means of production, as an indivisible 
property, rather than through contractual and individual relations. The 
liberal element in Mill’s conception springs from the fact that the asso-
ciation is in competition with other associations in a market regulated 
through a liberal framework. While its liberal side is certainly con-
nected to the contractual approach endorsed by Rawls’s, its socialist 
side would appear to be less consistent with Rawls’s political liberal-
ism, were it not for Rawls’s (2001) explicit endorsement of it in later 
writings (Norman, 2015, 48 -49).
Rawls’s does not discuss how Mill’s liberal socialism differs from a 
property -owning democracy. As Wayne Norman (2015, 51) notes, 
Rawls does not really distinguish between worker democracy (for 
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example, through worker councils), worker management, or worker 
oversight (for example, through co -determination governance struc-
tures in which both workers and owners have representatives who 
oversee their interests and worker ownership). But as Norman (2015, 
51) explains, the key problem is precisely how do define property, and 
its rights of use, fruition and disposal, in a way that takes into account 
the challenges posed by the separation between ownership and control 
that characterizes modern corporations (Berle and Means, 1932; Chan-
dler, 1977). By not fully distinguishing these various situations, and the 
implications they have for rights and obligations concerning use, fru-
ition and disposal, it becomes easy for Rawls to see Mill’s liberal social-
ism as akin to a property -owning democracy. But this also leaves us 
with more degrees of freedom for discussing the meaning of a property-
-owning democracy beyond a purely contractual view of the corpora-
tion.
The problems with the contractual view of the corporations outlined 
above could seem to suggest that amongst the regimes that Rawls sees 
as compatible with his principles of justice, it is Mill’s liberal socialism, 
rather than a property -owning democracy seen in purely liberal terms, 
that can best accommodate the problems raised by the modern corpo-
ration, namely its incompatibility with a contractual view. In Mill’s 
liberal socialism (as expressed in chapter 7 of book IV of his Principles), 
the members of an association take no capital with them when leaving 
it, and have only a right to use the indivisible property of the associa-
tion, rather than a right of arbitrary disposal. This provides a view 
which is more in tune with the complex legal mechanisms surrounding 
the corporation and the rights and obligations of its various stakehold-
ers, rather than a view in which the members of the association stand 
in merely contractual relationships through which owning a share of 
capital brings absolute rights of use, fruition and disposal. Of course, 
associations of workers such as cooperatives can hire workers with no 
right to a share of profits, who are mere wage -earners. But Mill sees 
this situation as the deterioration of the cooperative system, to be 
replaced again by private property.
Rawls (2001, 176) himself seems to believe that Mill’s liberal social-
ism is fully compatible with a property -owning democracy, as Norman 
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(2015, 49) notes, the reason being that firms are not owned or controlled 
by the state. Rawls’s reference to Mill’s liberal socialism as a form of 
property -owning democracy seems to presuppose that Rawls allows 
for a notion of property where rights of use, fruition and disposal may 
be defined in a different way than in classical liberalism. It provides 
thus an important guidance when searching for the best compromise 
between Rawls’s views and the actual world, without necessarily com-
mitting Rawls’s to Mill’s specific views on socialism. For Rawls also 
seems to be unable to assess whether Mill’s proposal is doomed to 
failure, and asks himself why did it fail, without providing any answer 
(Norman 2015, 49 -50). Rawls’s reference to Mill’s liberal socialism 
merely means that he allows for a broader range of possibilities beyond 
a classical liberal view with absolute property rights.
The question of the specific social and economic regime to be reached 
through an overlapping consensus, of course, turns on whether the 
corporation can be managed efficiently through methods that allow for 
more internal democracy, such as those advocated by Mill. This is a 
topic that Rawls leaves unaddressed, as Norman (2015, 49 -50) notes, 
and can certainly benefit from further analysis. In any case, anything 
resembling Mill’s liberal socialism seems to point towards the need of 
a social ontology where rights and duties are much more complex than 
anything presupposed in merely contractual approaches. The status of 
member of a cooperative in Mill’s conception comprises a set of rights 
and duties which shows with more transparency how normativity is 
already built into every form of social organization, as the social ontol-
ogies of Searle (2010) and Lawson (2012) also show.
Concluding remarks
Rawls is concerned with achieving a society where various individuals 
face a fair equality of opportunity. As O’Neill (2009, 382) notes, this 
means that capital must be widely dispersed, as in a property -owning 
democracy, rather than concentrated in a few hands as in the different 
varieties of capitalism. Furthermore, a wide diffusion of property 
would prevent social and economic inequality, thus reducing the 
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concentration of power, and checking the associated inequalities of 
social status (O’Neill, 2009, 383) that lead to “widespread attitudes of 
deference and servility on one side and a will to dominate and arro-
gance on the other” (Rawls, 2001, 131).
The abolition of deference, servility, domination and arrogance are 
all central goals of a liberal view of the world. Liberal authors who 
pursued similar goals in the past, like Smith and Mill, found the need 
of a moral conception (based in sympathy and other moral sentiments 
in the case of Smith, and in utility in the case of Mill’s utilitarianism) 
when addressing ethical problems. Rawls follows a different perspec-
tive, for which he finds inspiration in Kant, of providing a purely polit-
ical conception of justice. Rawls’s political liberalism is concerned with 
the prevention of inequalities at the level of power and status (O’Neill, 
2009, 383), while also allowing for the existence of heterogeneous moral 
conceptions within an overlapping consensus on key principles.
However, by neglecting status and the associated rights and duties, 
a political conception of justice tends to neglect the fact that human 
activity is inherently normative, as the social ontologies of Searle (2010) 
and Lawson (2012) show. Human coordination presupposes expecta-
tions as to what other human agents will do, and those expectations, a 
result of habit and custom, entail irreducibly normative conceptions as 
to what an individual should do, as Smith and Mill saw clearly. Modern 
corporations pose further problems to the extent that they presuppose 
hierarchical relations of status, which are radically at odds with a lib-
eral view of society. In fact, corporations transgress the basic divides 
of a liberal framework, such as the distinction between market and 
government, state and society, privilege and equality, status and con-
tract, and, more importantly, the public and the private (Ciepley, 2013, 
140; Singer, 2015, 68).
There are various methods for addressing the corporation and its 
impact on power and status through a social ontology perspective. 
Searle (2010) uses a social ontology that is particularly adequate for 
studying Rawls’s theory of justice, since it is also grounded on analyt-
ical philosophy (Martins, 2017). While Searle (2010) focuses on the basic 
building blocks of institutional reality, Rawls (1971) focuses on the insti-
tutions that are created in order to assess whether they are just or not 
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(Searle, 2010, 134). Like Rawls, Searle (2010) also distinguishes between 
basic liberties (central to Rawls’s first principle) while focusing on 
social and economic inequality at a separate level.
But as noted above, it may be difficult to specify freedom regardless 
of the means for achieving it, as Sen (2009) argues. This has implications 
for the possibility of distinguishing Rawls’s principles of justice. In 
such a case, one would need a social ontology more focused on human 
capabilities in general (Lawson, 2003, 2012; Martins, 2007, 2017), rather 
than on a separation between basic liberties and socio -economic ine-
quality, which Rawls’s undertakes in order to achieve a political con-
ception of justice, while inevitably presupposing a shared moral 
conception concerning the value of democracy, decency, tolerance and 
the like. Thus, whatever route is followed, a moral conception must be 
presupposed at some level. The question is not so much whether we 
can achieve a political consensus amongst disparate moral views, but 
rather which are the basic elements for a shared moral conception 
(Lawson, 2003; Martins, 2007), within a social ontology that takes into 
account the distribution of positional powers, that is, of rights and 
duties associated with status (Searle, 2010; Lawson, 2012).
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